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ESSAY
The Subverting of the Goeduck: Sex and
Gender, Which and That, and Other
Adventures in the Language of the Law
I remember when my parents bought me my first encyclo-
pedia-the World Book, 1955 edition. As 10-year-old boys will
do, I set about exploring the volumes for racy material. One of
the first entries I turned to was "Lady Godiva." Across from
the distinctly disappointing entry on Godiva was a photograph
of one of the oddest creatures I had ever set eyes on: the
Panope generosa, or goeduck clam. That's spelled g-o-e-d-u-c-
k.x
You won't find that spelling anywhere today-not even in
Washington state, where the goeduck is indigenous, is an
important food and trade commodity, and is a college mascot.2
Nor will you find the original spelling in any dictionary,3 nor
in the Encyclopedia Britannica,4 nor in the World Book.5 The
spelling "goeduck" was adopted by the first English-speaking
settlers of the Northwest in an effort to render phonetically
the native name for the clam, which in the Coast Salish tongue
sounded something like goiduck or gweeduck.6 That phonetic
spelling has now been eradicated.
When did g-o-e-d-u-c-k become g-e-o-d-u-c-k? The
inverted spelling had probably started to creep into usage even
before 1956. Certainly sometime between 1956, when"goeduck" was accepted as the correct spelling, and 1976, by
1. Goeduck, 7 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 3041 (1955). You can look it up.
2. The Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington.
3. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 798 (2d
ed. 1987) (giving "gweduc" but not "goeduck" as a variant spelling).
4. Clam, II Micropaedia 961, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA (1980).
5. 8 WORLD BOOK 92 (1990) (listing "goeduc" and "gweduck" as variant spelling).
See also id. at 246: "Goeduck. See Geoduck."
6. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 3, at 798; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, WASHINGTON STATE
SHELLFISH 19 (1978).
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which time only an occasional document could be found con-
taining that spelling, it happened. W/here did it happen? No
one is sure, but in all likelihood the motivating force behind
the change was the Washington State Code Reviser's Office,
and the conspirators were the Washington Department of
Fisheries and the Office of the State Printer.
How and why did it happen? Again, no one knows for
sure. And even though it was not so terribly long ago, barely a
person can be found in Washington State government who
remembers seeing the work spelled "goeduck." My best guess
as to what happened is this: Somewhere along the line, some
well-meaning sub-sub-reviser of the Washington Administra-
tive Code-repository of, among other things, shellfish regula-
tionsT--decided that the word did not look quite right. "Goe-,"
after all, is an uncommon English letter combination. "Geo-,"
by contrast, thanks to the Greeks, is comfortably familiar. And
while "earth-duck" makes little sense as a name for a species
of clam, the strange-looking formation "goeduck" made no
sense at all to this sub-sub, who took it upon himself to "cor-
rect" the spelling. Today, throughout Washington and the
world, the common name for Panope generosa is spelled"geoduck."
What harm does it do? Little, except to move the word's
spelling a step further away from its pronunciation. Someone
encountering the word "goeduck" for the first time could make
a fair stab at pronouncing it correctly. Someone encountering
the word "geoduck" for the first time is doomed to failure.
Newcomers to Washington must have the word pronounced for
them and then wonder why it isn't spelled the way it sounds.
They (and most natives as well) have no way of knowing that
it used to be.
Although little harm results from the inability to discern
the pronunciation of a word by a phonetic reading, this little
episode in anti-etymology illustrates the control that the law
exercises over language. Codebooks can effectively mandate a
change in language, even when the changed form is less logical
than the original, even when the changed form is inconsistent
with the original, even when the changed form is an error. It
makes one wonder: How many other errors have been codified
7. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-56-310 (Shellfish-Daily bag limit) and
§ 220-56-355 (Clams-Unlawful acts) (1986).
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into our language, and what effect have these errors had on
our thoughts and on our ability to articulate those thoughts?
The "adventures in the language of the law" that follow
examine some contemporary usage problems that have special
implications for the law and suggest ways these problems
might be avoided or resolved.
I. WHY WE FIGHT: "GENDER" AND "SEX"
Why shouldn't we quarrel about a word? What is the
good of words if they aren't important enough to quarrel
over? Why do we choose one word more than another if
there isn't any difference between them?
-- G. K. Chesterton
Why not bend to the prevailing winds? Why fight for a
spelling, a meaning, or a distinction that many view as out-
dated? The answer is that if the threatened usage is worth
preserving then it's worth fighting for, no matter how outdated
or schoolmarmish it may make its proponent appear. An espe-
cially timely case in point is the vanishing distinction between"sex" and "gender."
The framers of the nineteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution wrote:
The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex.8
Notice that the framers wrote "sex," not "gender." And
right they were. Gender is a property of words, not of people.
The only place that "gender discrimination" can occur is in a
grammar book, and when it does, it's pretty boring. Words
have gender; people have sex.
Webster's Second New International Dictionary Una-
bridged, still one of the most respected authorities on Ameri-
can English, records that the word "sex" pertains to
physiological distinctions, "gender" to grammatical ones. 9
Fowler's Modern English Usage agrees:
gender, n., is a grammatical term only. To talk of per-
sons or creatures of the masculine or feminine g., meaning
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
9. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcToNARY, UNABRIDGED 2296 (2d ed. 1934).
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of the male or female sex, is either a jocularity (permissible
or not according to context) or a blunder.' °
The great New York Times editor and usage watchdog,
Theodore M. Bernstein, cautioned that
gender is a grammatical term, denoting (in English)
whether words pertaining to a noun or pronoun are classed
as masculine, feminine or neuter. It is not a substitute for"sex" (but then, what is?). Indeed, in some foreign lan-
guages "gender" often disregards sex. In German, for exam-
ple, Weib, the word for woman, is neuter; in French plume,
the word for pen, a sexless article, is feminine. To use "gen-
der" as if it were synonymous with "sex" is an error, and a
particularly unpardonable one in scientific writing."
Even the more liberal Harper Dictionary of Contemporary
Usage concurs:
The use of gender to mean "sex" in senses other than
grammatical is considered "colloquial" by some dictionaries
but is frowned on by careful users of the language. To say"students of the feminine gender" is pretentious. "Women
students" is much better.12
Why then, with so many authoritative voices raised in sup-
port of preserving the distinction between "gender" and"sex,"'13 do so many constitutional scholars (who ought to know
10. H.W. FowLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 221 (2d ed. 1965).
11. T.M. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL WRITER: A MODERN GUIDE TO ENGLISH USAGE
199 (1965).
12. W. AND M. MORRIS, HARPER DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY USAGE 253 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Baker, A Furless Joy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1990, at A27, col. 5:
"What is one of the most disgusting things about America today?" she had
asked.
The instant I replied, "Discrimination based on sex," she blew a whistle
and I was surrounded by a crowd hissing me for not saying "discrimination
based on gender."
I fled to the nearest saloon. "What's the difference between a couple in
the park and a martini?" I asked the saloonkeeper.
"Easy," he said. "The couple can have sex but the martini can only have
gender, which, by the way, would be neuter."
Id. See also Gender, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, IV. Micropaedia 457-58 (1980) (dis-
cussing "gender" as a classification of grammar, and admitting no alternate meanings);
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENGLISH 9 (A. Zeiger, ed. 1973) ("GENDER... is that modification of
a word by means of which objects are distinguished in regard to sex."); Burkat, Of
Gender, Sex, Grammar and All That, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1990, at A16, col. 1 ("Many
English-speaking women have taken ideological positions that have nothing to do with
the difference between 'gender' and 'sex.'... [L]et us all remember one simple fact of
life: words have gender; people have sex."); The Canadian Press, Sex and Titles, 148
[Vol. 14:755
Adventures in the Language of the Law
better) and government officials (who probably can't be
expected to) speak of "gender discrimination"? It could be
that they are talking about how to distinguish a masculine pro-
noun from a feminine one. But unless they are discussing the
specific language of a law or bill, they are probably not talking
about pronouns. Usually they are talking about men and
women, and when they say "gender" what they mean is "sex."
This ascription of a purely grammatical property to human
beings, suggests that people-at least some people--can no
longer distinguish between a thing and its name.
There are at least two possible reasons for the ubiquity of
the "sex"-"gender" error. The first is that legislators and legal
writers may think that the word "sex" is nasty. It is, after all,
distracting. It makes people think lurid thoughts, and lets
them forget that discrimination is serious business.
But if that's the problem, the scholars only compound it by
substituting the word "gender," which-apart from being the
wrong word for what they mean-is a mellifluous, gentle-
sounding word, ill-suited to the tough, serious-minded purpose
of constitutional scholars and the only slightly less serious-
minded purpose of government officials. "Gender" is not a
firm, no-nonsense word like "sex." It has an evasive, almost
euphemistic effect, like calling a war an "incursion" or a spade
an "excavation implement" instead of a dirty shovel.
A second explanation for constitutional scholars' eagerness
to use the word "gender" in the civil rights context may be
that they think the word "sex" is ambiguous. They may be
afraid that if they said "discrimination on account of sex,"
their readers would think they meant sexual activity, orienta-
tion, or preference. 14 But the literate reader would not think
Copy TALK 3 (1990) ("don't confuse sex with gender. When you're writing about dif-
ferences between men and women, or about discrimination, the issue is sex. When
you're dealing with differences in grammatical form (actor and actress, prince and
princess), the issue is gender."); Wood, Who's Who and What's What?, IABC COMMU-
NICATION WORLD, September 1990, at 42.
14. W.B. Allen, chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights made this
erroneous claim explicitly in a recent speech, when he said, "I consider it a matter of
great regret that our legislators so infelicitously used the term 'sex' rather than
'gender' in our civil rights statutes. For that may well be the proximate cause of folk
taking them too literally, and attempting to make sex itself a political matter."
Address by W.B. Allen, Blacks? Animals? Homosexuals? What Is a Minority?,
Symposium on Public Policy Implications of Contemporary Homosexuality (Oct. 7,
1989) reprinted in LVI:7 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 204, 207 (Jan. 15, 1990).
Actually, the legislators' use of the word "sex" would have been "infelicitous" only if
they were legislating the civil rights of words rather than those of human beings.
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that, because the literate reader knows that the word for that
concept is not "sex" but "sexuality."
The University of Puget Sound School of Law'" is cur-
rently offering a course entitled "Gender and Justice." I am
sure the course has nothing to do with choosing appropriate
nouns and pronouns when writing judicial opinions. It should
be called "Sex and Justice." I can appreciate the likely com-
plaint: "If we called it that, people might think that the course
was about justice and sexual conduct, rather than sex discrimi-
nation." Maybe, then, the course should be given a different
name. Just because the word "sex" is ambiguous, meaning
both a biological trait of organisms and the conduct associated
with the reproduction of organisms, does not legitimize the
misuse of "gender." To say that "People might misunderstand'sex,' so we'll say 'gender' instead" makes as much sense as
saying, "People might misunderstand 'pen,' so we'll say 'pencil'
instead." If what you really mean is "pen," you cannot force
the second term to become a synonym for the first; trying to do
so merely compounds the problem.
A recent colloquy in the New York Times has extended
the debate. Responding to the Times's use of the term 'gender
gap,' the editor of a technological journal wrote: "The term'gender' is increasingly misused as a substitute for 'sex.' . . . I
can only assume you have elected to permit this misuse,
despite a valid and useful distinction between the terms."'11
(Authority for the validity of the distinction is noted above; its
usefulness will be addressed below.) A few weeks later
another reader answered:
[T]he use of the word 'gender' to mean an individual's
sex is well established in English and recognized by current
dictionaries as standard.... The two usage guides [that the
first writer] cites . . .have been superseded by guides that
have kept pace .... (Lady Mary Wortley Montagu wrote in
1709: "Of the fair sex ... my only consolation for being of
that gender") .... [A] use that stresses the social and cul-
tural over the biological differences between the sexes has
steadily grown since about 1960.17
15. The standard registration form for the University of Puget Sound School of
Law consistently asks me for my gender. I consistently deny having one.
16. Weinstein, 'Gender' Cannot Replace Sex' (but What Can?), N.Y. Times, Dec.
27, 1990, at A18, col. 3 (citing Fowler, supra note 3, and Bernstein, supra note 4).
17. Steinmetz, Dictionaries Recognize 'Gender'for 'Sex,'N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1991,
at A18, col. 3-4. Steinmetz cites A. OAKLEY, SEX, GENDER, AND SocIETY (1972) for the
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It must be borne in mind that the latter response comes
from a dictionary editor. Of course there have been
instances-some highly respectable ones--of the use of "gen-
der" in place of "sex." Lady Montagu's ambivalence--and
Charles Dickens's more famous whimsicality, "black divinities
of the feminine gender"' 8-both easily fit Fowler's exception
for "jocularity." It is the non-jocular use of "gender" for "sex"
that is at best confusing and at worst dangerous.
As the responding writer insisted, there is now ample
authority for the proposition that "gender" means the same
thing as "sex." That is because most dictionaries now defer to
the popular error. Our lexicons have become like competing
television news teams, trying to one-up one another. A
usage-no matter how inappropriate, retrograde, or downright
wrong-that gains a modicum of popular acceptance is now
welcomed with open arms into the citadel of the language by
the very forces that once vigilantly guarded our tongue against
assaults on clarity, precision, and meaning. Dictionaries
become destroyers rather than preservers of the language
when they rush to record an erroneous or ambiguous usage
merely because it has become popular. Dictionaries have
become levelers of language, refusing to recognize that a
majority often can be wrong. Dictionary editors' work is self-
admittedly descriptive rather than proscriptive. For that rea-
son, dictionary editors have less interest in the correctness,
clarity, or social impact of words than in reporting their
usages, right or wrong. Dictionary editors merely record, and
having recorded move on.
Popular usage may make a wrong a right, but nothing can
restore the clarity of language that is thereby lost. That loss is
the cultural equivalent of the extinction of a species. Diction-
ary editors, in their zeal to "keep pace," are more eager to be
"with it" than "correct." But the value of language is not a
matter of contemporary style nor of traditional rules. It is a
matter of clarity. The test of a questionable usage must finally
proposition that "[s]ex differences may be 'natural,' but gender differences have their
sources in culture." It is always an author's prerogative to use a word in a novel way,
especially if the intention is made clear; but exercising that prerogative does not confer
universal validation on the usage, any more than it would if I were to write,
'"17hroughout this article, I shall use the word 'right' in the sense of 'wrong."' The
uncritical adoption of Oakley's specialized and somewhat fanciful use of "gender" to
refer to "cultural differences" may be an instance of the legal profession's rush to
adopt whatever neologistic jargon comes its way.
18. See "gender," WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DII'ONARY 473 (1981).
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be whether it enhances or diminishes understanding. If the
latter, then the dictionary that zealously "recognizes" a usage
that diminishes understanding only drives one more nail into
the coffin of the verbal discourse it once served to facilitate.
When a debated usage involves a distinction such as that
between "gender" and "sex," it little profits the disputants to
argue back and forth, each pointing to authority for one usage
or the other. The better approach is to ask, given authority for
the distinction, is the distinction worth preserving?
The distinction between "sex" and "gender" is a critical
one. If "sex" is accepted as a meaning of the word "gender,"
we are left with no way to express clearly and exclusively the
grammatical property that we mean by "gender." The result is
that the reader or listener is never sure whether the writer or
speaker is using "gender" in the traditional grammatical sense
or in the neological "cultural" sense. This forces the writer or
speaker to clarify the term each time it is used, which in turn
requires more words and makes communication more taxing
for both communicator and audience. If the writer or speaker
fails to clarify the term, it is left to the reader or listener to do
so, and the writer or speaker runs the risk that the reader or
listener will do so incorrectly, causing communication to fail.
Thus, we would have the discursive equivalent of what
microeconomists call a market defect.
The distinction between "gender" and "sex" is also worth
preserving because the distinction provides a brief and easy
way to specify whether the subject is language or people. If
the distinction between "gender" and "sex" is maintained, a
reliable difference in law and in fact exists between making a
statute "gender-neutral" (meaning that it should contain no
masculine or feminine pronouns) and making it "sex-neutral"
(meaning that it should have no consequences that would favor
either sex over the other). If the distinction between "sex"
and "gender" is obscured or obliterated, it would be unclear
whether a "gender-neutral" statute would be expected to be
neutral in language only, in impact only, or in both.19 The arti-
ficial (and etymologically unsupported) assertion that "gender"
refers to cultural differences and "sex" to biological differ-
19. This raises the question of linguistic revisionism as political tactic: Does the
insistence on gender-neutrality-and its resultant blurring of the distinction between
"gender" and "sex"-create a condition in which the gender-neutrality of a statute's
language guarantees the sex-neutrality of its actual impact? This question could be the
subject of another article, but is beyond the scope of this one.
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ences, if accepted, would leave us with no way to determine
what is meant by a "gender-neutral" statute, and would make
it all too easy for legislators to palm-off a gender-neutral stat-
ute where a sex-neutral one was actually sought.
The word "fireman" will serve to illustrate the difference
between gender-neutrality and sex-neutrality. "Fireman" is
not gender-neutral; it is of the masculine gender. It is, how-
ever, sex-neutral, just like "chairman," and many other words
than end in -man. The suffix "man" in this case means "per-
son," not "adult male." The word "firefighter," by contrast, is
both gender-neutral and sex-neutral.
"Firefighter" is the better word, though, not because it is
gender-neutral but because it is a more precise term for the
concept it represents and, conveniently, a more interesting
word as well. Nevertheless, the allegation of sexism in such
words as "fireman" and the attendant effort to purge the lan-
guage of that sexism raise some interesting questions.
Does the word-choice of "firefighter" over "fireman" effec-
tively suppress the notion that all firemen are, or must be,
male? Did such a notion exist in the first place? If it did, it
has been effectively abolished by changed hiring practices and
new attitudes, not by the use of one word over another.
One of the few Federal Rules of Evidence to have thus far
escaped gender-neutralization is Rule 606, which reads in rele-
vant part:
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
made by him concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.2°
In fact, the careful use of "the juror" rather than "he" as
the subject of "precluded" suggests that an attempt was made
to gender-neutralize the rule, but that one "him" slipped by
unnoticed. However, it is an easy matter to correct:
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
made by the juror concerning a matter about which the
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes.
We have now gender-neutralized the rule. We have not,
however, sex-neutralized it, because (and this is the point) it
20. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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was sex-neutral from the start. That is to say, no female juror
could escape its ambit merely because a masculine pronoun
was used.
On the issue of gender-sensitivity, the Associated Press
now directs its readers this way:
man, mankind. Either may be used when both men and
women are involved and when no other term is conve-
nient.... Frequently the best choice is a substitute such as
humanity, a person or an individual.2 '
No one will put up much of a fight over changing "man-
kind" to "humanity." At the same time, no one can argue
credibly that "mankind" intends to exclude half of the human
race, nor that it is likely to be misunderstood as doing so. But
avoiding misunderstanding is only one motivation for changing
a word. In the case of "gender" and "sex," preserving a distinc-
tion achieves clarity of meaning. In the case of "mankind" and
"humanity" (both of which contain the syllable "man"), the
motivation for changing the word is harder to find. There are
two reasons for changing a word: first, it's not the right word
or the best word for the job; second, it's not the word we're out
to change; it's the idea. Questions about word substitutions,
the motivations behind those substitutions, and their effective-
ness, must therefore be fact-specific.
II. IT'S NOT THE RIGHT WoRD: A MAD TEA PARTY
"You should learn not to make personal remarks," Alice
said with some severity: "it's very rude."
The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing this;
but all he said was "Why is a raven like a writing-desk?"
"Come, we shall have some fun now!" thought Alice.
"I'm glad they've begun asking riddles-I believe I can guess
that," she added aloud.
"Do you mean that you think you can find out the
answer to it?" said the March Hare.
"Exactly so," said Alice.
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare
went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean
what I say-that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why, you
21. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK 121 (1980).
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might just as well say that "I see what I eat' is the same
thing as 'I eat what I see'!"
"You might just as well say," added the March Hare,
"that 'I like what I get' is the same thing as 'I get what I
like!"
"You might just as well say," added the Dormouse,
which seemed to be talking in its sleep, "that 'I breathe
when I sleep' is the same thing as 'I sleep when I breathe'!"
"It is the same thing with you," said the Hatter, and
here the conversation dropped.... 22
A word may be ripe for change if it is not the right word.
A word is not the right word if it is inaccurate to express the
intended meaning, if it is ambiguous and likely to result in
misunderstanding, or if it is simply uninteresting. People also
seek to change a word because it is not the best word: it may
be inappropriate, ineffective, or counterproductive in the con-
text. An increasingly common reason for finding certain words
not to be the best is that they offend. A word may offend
because it is inherently offensive, or because some person or
group is especially sensitive to it.
Few words if any are inherently offensive; but they can
come to be so. Ernst Cassirer, in his study Language and
Myth, describes how the alteration of a word-initially a name,
to which mystic significance is aboriginally attached--can
effectively alter the concept it codifies:
Whenever a special god is first conceived, it is invested
with a special name, which is derived from the particular
activity that has given rise to the deity. As long as this name
is understood, and taken in its original sense, the limits of its
meaning are the limits of the god's powers; through his
name the god is permanently held to that narrow field for
which he was originally created. Quite otherwise, however,
if through an accident of phonetic changes or the obsoles-
cence of its verbal root the name loses its meaning and its
connection with the living language. Then the name no
longer suggests to those who use it the idea of a single activ-
ity, to which the subject that bears it must be exclusively
bound. The word has become a proper name--and this con-
notes, just like the given name of a man, the conception of a
personality. Thus, a new Being has been produced, which
22. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 59-61 (Washington Square
Press ed. 1963).
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continues to develop by a law of its own."3
Today, someone named Shoemaker is not necessarily a
cobbler. The process by which a neutral word becomes offen-
sive is similar. A black man, for example, called negro
("black") by a Spanish-speaking slave-trader, comes to be
called nigger by a Southern plantation owner of Scottish ori-
gin. By its association with servility and inferiority, the word
nigger itself comes to mean something quite different from
'%lack man." It takes on "a law of its own." It comes to hurt,
and finally, to be used for no purpose other than hurting.
Lenny Bruce recognized this in his pioneering and iconoclastic
effort to sensitize the public's language-consciousness:
Are there any niggers here tonight? I know that one
nigger who works here, I see him back there. Oh, there's
two niggers, customers, and ah, aha! Between those two nig-
gers sits one kike-man, thank God for the kike! ... The
point? That the word's suppression gives it the power, the
violence, the viciousness. If President Kennedy got on tele-
vision and said, "Tonight I'd like to introduce the niggers in
my cabinet," and he yelled "niggerniggerniggernigger" at
every nigger he saw, '%oogeyboogeyboogeyboogeyboogey,
niggerniggerniggernigger" till nigger didn't mean anything
any more, till nigger lost its meaning-you'd never make any
four-year-old nigger cry when he came home from school.2 4
Growing up in the South, I heard white kids use the word
nigger to insult other white kids. The word itself had become
inherently offensive apart from its original meaning. This was
why Lenny Bruce's campaign was unsuccessful: Making the
word meaningless so it would no longer hurt was a futile prop-
osition, because the word had already been separated from its
meaning and had become merely a weapon. No matter how
many times it was said or in what context, it would still hurt.2"
Words that are used only to hurt are justly attacked. On
the other hand, words whose offensiveness arises not from the
23. E. CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 20-21 (1953) (emphasis in original)
(referring to Usener's original research).
24. L. BRUCE, THE ESSENTIAL LENNY BRUCE 15-16 (J. Cohen ed. 1968).
25. In a famous comedy routine, the "Seven Words You Cannot Say on
Television," George Carlin assaulted the notion of inherently offensive words.
Interestingly, in a recent national cable-television broadcast (The USA Channel, Dec.
22, 1990) of an R-rated comedy, The Kentucky Fried Movie, four words were excised
from the film as objectionable. All had sexual or scatological connotations except one:
"nigger."
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use of the word but from the sensitivity of the listener are
more problematic. Much of the attack on sexism in the Eng-
lish language falls into this category. Some of the words
attacked as sexist might, in time, become offensive by separa-
tion from their natural root-meaning just as "nigger" has
become offensive by separation from its root meaning. But in
most contexts, words such as "mankind," "lady," and the use of
"he" as the referent to an antecedent indefinite pronoun are
still acceptable, correct, and inoffensive. Nevertheless, listen-
ers' sensitivities, whether justified or not, create a new motiva-
tion for changing a word: not offense, but fear of offending.
Increasingly, writers, or those who exercise authority over
them, fear that their words might offend. Thus, well-meaning
social workers and public administrators have run us through a
number of euphemisms for "old"-"elderly," "senior citizen,"
"Golden Ager," and "aging"-under the assumption that the
term "old" might be offensive to old people. But I've never
known an old person who had the slightest hesitation about
using the term "old," nor have I found anyone who has known
one. We have gone from "colored" to "Negro" to "Black" to
"African American" and back to "people of color" without ever
hitting upon a term that all black Americans will accept. That
is as it should be: group classification based on physical
description should be unacceptable, and we should not be com-
fortable with any universal term that implies such a classifica-
tion. Yet our discomfort is too easily codified into a new kind
of tyranny: the tyranny of over-caution.26
The rush to avoid offense-whether because a word is
inherently offensive, because readers are sensitive, or because
a writer is overcautious-may lead to ungrammatical, illogical,
or unclear constructions. The effort toward gender-neutrality
provides a handy example of how this occurs: It is now com-
mon to find a plural pronoun mismatched with a singular ante-
cedent in a strained effort to achieve gender-neutrality. Here
is an example:
A. If an employee alleges a violation of their rights, they
have no recourse.
The singular antecedent noun ("employee") cannot give
rise to a plural pronoun ("their"). One "employee" cannot
26. See, e.g., Goodman, Decreasing Our Word Power: The New Newspeak, N.Y.
Times Book Review, Jan. 27, 1991, at 14.
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magically become more than one just four words later (unless
the employee in question is a paramecium). One of the most
commonly suggested ways of avoiding the anomaly of referring
to a singular employee in the plural is to recast the entire sen-
tence in the plural:
B. If employees allege a violation of their rights, they have
no recourse.
Now we have a grammatically correct and logical sentence,
but it no longer does the job. It suggests a group, rather than a
single, allegation. Clarity and precision are lost. Traditionally,
English grammar solved the problem by using the generic"he."
C. If an employee alleges a violation of his rights, he has
no recourse.
Now we have agreement between pronoun and antecedent.
We have logic. We have a construction that is still Good Law
to grammarians. And there is no chance of misunderstanding.
No one would assume that the sentence, as it stands, applies
only to male employees and that some different standard
would apply if a female employee were to make a similar alle-
gation. Both grammar and idom affirm that the sentence
applies to any employee, regardless of sex.
So we have good grammar-but do we have good taste?
The sentence is not likely to confuse, but is it likely to offend?
It will offend those who have decided that the use of the mas-
culine gender in such a construction as this reflects, approves,
and perpetuates a male dominance that arguably led to the
development of this grammatical convention in the first place.
So our task is not finished.
If we wish not to offend, what options remain? We have
already rejected the ungrammatical commingling of singular
with plural and the misleading recasting of the entire sentence
in the plural. Accepting the need to stay in the singular for
both accuracy and clarity, let's consider some contemporary
solutions:
D. If an employee alleges a violation of his or her rights,
he or she has no recourse.
There is nothing grammatically wrong with this construc-
tion, but few would accept it as less than cumbersome. The
addition of words makes the reader work harder, while giving
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that reader no additional reward. The extra words do not clar-
ify a message that was already clear. What those extra words
do, instead, is to distract the reader from the sentence's mean-
ing by steering the reader's attention into a subtext: The
writer is saying, aside, "Hey, look, I know that not all employ-
ees are men, and I want you to know that I respect that." It's a
self-congratulatory tone that says less about the writer's atti-
tude toward sexism, either in the workplace or in the lan-
guage, than it says about the writer's eagerness to be perceived
as sensitive and hip. For this reason, the device is as insincere
and cloying as it is cumbersome and intrusive. It does not
avoid offense; it only redirects it.
Another solution is one used several times in the preced-
ing paragraph: Don't use a pronoun at all, but repeat the noun
instead.
E. If an employee alleges a violation of the employee's
rights, the employee has no recourse.
The problem with this solution is not grammatical but sty-
listic. The repetition makes the sentence arhythmic and dull.
It is correct, but not reader-friendly. And, in this example at
least, it could introduce a new confusion: Is the "employee"
who is the subject of the sentence the same employee whose
rights are allegedly violated? It all depends upon context, and
to the extent that this construction may send the reader back
to a previous sentence to ascertain whether one or two employ-
ees are being discussed, it is intrusive and unacceptable.
For the same reason, equally unacceptable is the idea of
leaving the prepositional object unmodified altogether:
F. If an employee alleges a violation of rights ...
or
If an employee alleges a rights violation ...
Here again, it is unclear whose rights are the subject of the
alleged violation, and the reader is again forced to explore con-
text. This solution is therefore acceptable only when the con-
text is so well established that there is no chance that the
reader will misunderstand.
An increasingly popular solution is to recast the sentence
in the feminine gender:
G. If an employee claims a violation of her rights, she has
no recourse.
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Because this usage, though grammatically and socially cor-
rect, is less familiar and time-honored than the use of the
generic masculine, there is a danger that, this time, the reader
really might think that employees of only one sex are being
discussed. Once again, context will make this clear; but, unlike
the case in constructions E and F, the reader is not likely to
return to a previous passage to see if only female employees
are being discussed. Given clarity of context, the "her" should
slide by as easily as a "his" would have traditionally, not caus-
ing a second's confusion. An increasing number of writers and
teachers use this solution, employing generic feminine pro-
nouns interchangeably with generic masculine throughout
their discourse, preserving the indefiniteness while avoiding
offense.
Another solution, which works particularly well in a con-
text such as the one in our example, is the use of a
hypothetical:
H. Suppose that Mary, an employee, claims a violation of
her rights...
Here, even more than in G, it is clear that the message
isn't restricted to female employees. At the same time, the use
of a female as an example avoids the offense that might attend
the assumption that the "employee" is male. It shows the
reader the writer's comfort with femininity in the workplace
and in the language. Most importantly, it is as effective as
example D, and makes the sentence more, not less, interesting.
And that is the point: If offensiveness-whether inherent,
acquired, or imputed by sensitivity or overcaution-makes it
advisable to change a word or phrase, it can be done interest-
ingly and creatively, without wounding the logic and rhythm of
our language in the process.
III. WRONG WORDS, WRONG IDEAS
If thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt
thought.
-- George Orwell
Sometimes it's not the ambiguity or the inherent or
imputed offensiveness of a word that motivates change. Some-
times change is motivated by the notion that, by changing the
word, one can change or suppress the idea that it expresses. If
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Cassirer's famous thesis that language precedes thought7 is
correct, then by limiting, arbitrarily redefining, or eliminating
individual words, we can also alter and destroy ideas. Because
the misuse of words broadens the gap between what is said and
what is meant, words may be misused deliberately by those
who prefer that we not understand. George Orwell, in his
novel, Animal Farm, and in his depiction of "Newspeak," in
1984, saw the manipulation of language as an index of every-
thing that is most dangerous about totalitarianism.
Contemporary lore is rich with examples of just such
deception practiced, on occasion, by our own government.'
Richard Gambino has described how the Watergate conspira-
tors' use of language diverted moral responsibility from the
actors to the acts, from the speakers to their words:
In a now famous phrase, Ron Ziegler and John
Ehrlichman have declared White House statements proven
false to be "no longer operative." This is a very handy
phrase which can mean any of the following:
It wasn't true in the first place.
I'm sorry I said it.
I thought it was true then but I know now it wasn't.
While the public was left wondering what the phrase
meant, responsibility for the original lies was shifted from
the liars to the lies themselves. The responsibility was not
in the people, not even in the stars, but in the. statements
themselves, which were spoken of as if they had lives and
energy of their own.29
In similar obfuscations, crimes became "dirty tricks," and
payments for such crimes became "increments in the form of
currency."'  More recently, missiles fixed with nuclear war-
heads are not weapons but "peacemakers."
When caught, a speaker might claim that he has "miss-
poken." What does this word mean? Does it denote a lie?
Does it denote an error? If it denotes an error, is the error one
of fact or one of judgment? Is this just a slip of the tongue, or
is the speaker engaging his mouth before his brain is in gear?
Of course, people may change words for reasons other
27. CASSiRER, supra note 23, at 5-12, 24-38.
28. Such deception is not limited to the government. See Goodman, supra note 26.
29. R. GAMBINO, Watergate Lingo: A Language of Non-Responsibility, in
LANGUAGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (H. Rank ed. 1974).
30. Id. at 18.
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than a desire to deceive. They may, from perfectly honorable
motives, proceed against a "bad" or "harmful" idea by attack-
ing its symbol-like the airmen in Catch-22 who try to get out
of flying a combat mission by changing a line on the map in the
operations room to make it look as if Bologna has already been
captured. As it happens, the altered map is believed; the mis-
sion is called off.3 ' But not for long. Catch-22 is literature,
after all. Moving a line on a map changes the reality it repre-
sents only in a short-lived comic fantasy.
The effort to change reality by changing our expression of
it is at best futile. Attitudes are not changed by manipulating
language; language is changed by influencing values. It is legit-
imate to change the name of the Personnel Department to the
Human Resources Department only if the verbal change is
accompanied by a policy change reflecting the greater apprecia-
tion for human beings that the newer term suggests. Trying to
change a reality by changing its name is tilting at windmills.
What you can change, however, is the perception of the
reality. In other words, you deceive. You not for long fool peo-
ple into believing that an incursion is something different from
a war, that a funeral director is not the same as an undertaker,
that a firefighter does something different from what a fire-
man does. On the other hand, you just might, through
repeated misuse, make them think that "gender" means the
same thing as "sex," or that an airplane crash has something to
do with "tragedy." The deception that results need not be
intentional, and it need not be the heinous sort of deception
decried by Orwell. It is deception nonetheless, and its effect
impoverishes the language and the culture.
This impoverishment is scarcely less true of so-called per-
suasive uses of language. The word "fetus," for example, is
used by pro-abortion forces because its Latinate, medical sound
carries with it the sense of an invasive growth, something for-
eign. The counterargument is that "fetus" is not a deliberately
misleading word, but the scientifically correct term to use up
until the birth. But how often do you hear a woman say, "I
feel my fetus kicking"? The opposing terms "fetus" and
"baby" serve the persuasive purposes of proponents of both
sides of the abortion issue, defining the poles of non-person
and person in an arena in which personhood is at the very
heart.
31. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 118-19 (Random House Modern Library ed. 1961).
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An old riddle asks, "If you call the sheep's tail a leg, how
many legs does a sheep have?" The answer: "four, because
calling the tail a leg doesn't make it one." Where we have
called the tail a leg for centuries, an effort to make us recog-
nize that it is a tail will probably be successful, because it
doesn't seek to change the reality or the perception of the real-
ity, only the naming of it. On the other hand, where we have
called the tail a tail, an effort to make us call it a leg will prob-
ably fail. The only acceptable reason for changing a word-the
only one that doesn't betray language, thought and culture-is
that it's the wrong word: It doesn't reflect the culture, the val-
ues, or the form that has evolved for expression of those. But
don't change the word that feels or sounds right merely
because it might offend someone; don't change the word
because it suggests an unpleasant thought or idea. That is
what the proponents of Newspeak and its contemporary mani-
festations attempt to do.
The law has the power to change language, and changing
language means changing, perhaps destroying, ideas. The
destruction or suppression of an idea--any idea-impoverishes
a culture. Lawyers, legislators, and academicians are, among
other things, custodians of the language, and their abuse of
that power-whether by deliberate novation or by simple
error-is serious business.3 2
The legal profession has for decades been in the vanguard
of the deconstruction of the English language. It is a sort of
Gresham's law of our language that bad words drive out good.
Lawyers, judges, legislators, and law professors have collec-
tively introduced more bad words and driven out more good
ones than has any other professional group, with the possible
exception of the news media. And it's ironic, because lawyers,
of all people, should be scrupulous about the use of language.
After all, lawyers are in the business of framing persuasive
arguments and authoritative dicta. The better those arguments
sound, the more likely they are to succeed. Precise and effec-
tive use of language is useful to lawyers; their abuse of it
makes as much sense as a workman deliberately breaking his
best tools.
32. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986), in which the
United States Supreme Court seized upon the grammatical ambiguity of a poorly-
written statute to justify deference to an administrative agency's allegedly overbroad
application of the law.
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IV. THE STRAW WHICH BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK, OR,
How's "THAT" AGAIN?
Everything that can be said can be said clearly.
-Ludwig Wittgenstein
Probably the greatest grammatical error that the legal
community has foisted off on an unsuspecting public is the con-
fusion of "which" and "that." It may stem from the notion
that "which" somehow sounds more formal and official than
"that"-never mind the fact that it doesn't have the same
meaning. Generation after generation of lawyers have found it
more lawyerly to say "which." Occasionally they're right; most
of the time they're wrong. But they're set in their ways. They
grew up reading The Little Engine Which Could and The
House Which Jack Built. Their moms read them the story of
"The Goose Which Laid the Golden Egg"-recognizing, of
course, that the hand which rocks the cradle rules the world.
In high school, they enjoyed Edgar Rice Burroughs's The Land
Which Time Forgot. When they got married, they sang "Blest
Be the Ties Which Bind." It all sounded more important and
official that way.
The fictional style of Scott Turow, a lawyer who is also a
professional novelist, reflects the author's legal training more
than it does his literary acumen:
"Ah-ha," said Stern. So they did know something. The
government was investigating large trades, trades which MD
handled, trades which Dixon knew about, trades which,
when placed, had had a significant impact on prices. "And is
there nothing else which occurs to you? '33
Nobody talks like that-not even a lawyer from Argen-
tina. Christopher Marlowe never wrote
Was this the face which launch'd a thousand ships...?3'
If he had, the line would be justly forgotten by now. Hem-
ingway, on the other hand, did write, "[T]here are some things
which cannot be learned quickly."' You cannot win them all.
33. S. TUROW, THE BURDEN OF PROOF 45-46 (1990).
34. See C. MARLOwE, THE TRAGICAL HISTORY OF DOCTOR FAUSTUS, V. i. 94-95:
Was this the face that launch'd a thousand ships,
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?
35. At least Hemingway is so quoted in 9 PUB. REL. J. 6 (September, 1990)-but
can you trust a publication that calls its letters column "Feedback"?
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Except when it is the object of a preposition ("in which we
serve"), the word "which" nearly always follows a comma and
introduces a phrase that provides additional information not
essential to the meaning of the sentence ("nonrestrictive" or"non-defining," the grammarians call it). The word "that," on
the other hand, introduces a phrase that is essential ("restric-
tive" or "defining"). Strunk & White's The Elements of Style,'
the venerable "little book," offers this example:
The lawn mower that is broken is in the garage.
This sentence means: "We have at least two lawnmowers,
one of them is broken, and the broken one is in the garage."
The lawn mower, which is broken, is in the garage.
This sentence means: "We have only one lawnmower, it is
in the garage, and, by the way, it's broken."
Here is another example of how a "which"-"that" confu-
sion could have significant impact on the interpretation of
evidence:
Her apartment had two windows which looked onto the
parking lot.
This construction is ambiguous. If "which" is really
meant, it should be preceded by a comma, to set off the
"which" clause as incidental. So amended, the sentence would
read:
Her apartment had two windows, which looked onto the
parking lot.
The meaning of this sentence is:
Her apartment had only two windows.
Both of the windows looked onto the parking lot.
By contrast, if the omission of the comma is correct, it may
suggest that the author intended "that" rather than "which."
If that is so, the sentence should read:
Her apartment had two windows that looked onto the
parking lot.
The meaning of this new sentence is quite different:
Her apartment may have had many windows.
Only two of those windows looked onto the parking lot.
36. W. STRuNx, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 47 (1935 & Macmillan
ed. 1959).
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If the case turns on the number and location of windows
in the apartment, this ambiguity could result in a miscarriage
of justice.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are among the biggest
offenders in the "which"-"that" arena. Rule 402, the basic rule
of admissibility, reads in part:
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.37
Like Alice, this rule does not mean what it says, or at least
it does not say what it means. What the rule says is this: Evi-
dence is not admissible; and, by the way, evidence is something
that is not relevant. What the rule means to say is this: There
are two kinds of evidence: the kind that is relevant and the
kind that is not; and the kind that is not relevant is not admis-
sible. Since this is what it means, it should read:
Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.
Alongside the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in
the "Which"-"That" Hall of Shame, stands Professor Karl
Llewellyn, Father of the Uniform Commercial Code. Among
his many strengths and greatnesses, knowing the difference
between "which" and "that" was not to be found. The Code
abounds with examples:
(1) A definite and seasonal expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance....
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the exist-
ence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise estab-
lish a contract.... 3s
Generations of lawyers accustomed to using and relying on
the UCC have been conditioned to ignore the difference
between "which" and "that." Professor Llewellyn, and others,
propounded the notion that "which" is not a word with its own
distinct meaning, but is merely a more formal way of saying
"that." These writers are wrong; the two words do have dis-
tinct meanings, and the clarity of legal writing depends on pre-
serving the difference. Most of the time, lawyers use "which"
when, if speaking aloud, they would say "that." Thinking that
37. FED. R. EVID. 402.
38. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990).
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they are adding formality and clarity by switching to "which,"
they are instead, in most cases, altering their meaning alto-
gether. As a rule of thumb, say it aloud to yourself. Does it
sound right, or does it sound stuffy? If it sounds stuffy, it's
probably wrong.
The legal profession's confusion of "which" and "that"
does more than irritate grammarians; it potentially sabotages
the very meaning of the law itself. By such confusions, legal
writers ironically destroy the very clarity upon which their
profession depends. The path of the law is littered with the
corpses of once-useful distinctions slaughtered by careless
usage.
V. ISLAND OF LOST DISTINCTIONS
One of the difficulties in the language is that all our
words from loose using have lost their edge.
-Ernest Hemingway
Sloppy language makes sloppy law, which in turn leads to
injustice. It was noted above that the confusion between "sex"
and "gender" makes it possible to adopt a gender-neutral stat-
ute instead of the sex-neutral one that was intended. If the
law perpetuates the notion that, for example, "differential"
means the same thing as "difference," or that "verbal" means
the same thing as "oral," our language loses useful words, use-
ful distinctions, useful concepts. Already few among us know
the once-useful distinctions among such words as podium, ros-
trum, lectern, dais, and pulpit; dock, pier, and wharf; prone and
supine; alternative, choice, and option; one another and each
other; tragedy, calamity, disaster, and catastrophe. Once "trag-
edy" comes to mean any regrettable event, from the death of a
child to a devastating earthquake, we find ourselves with no
word left to express what "tragedy" once meant-this is a gen-
uine example of how losing a word through misuse means los-
ing an idea.
The destruction of the meaning of "tragedy" is, of course,
the handiwork of the news media's corruption of language,
rather than the fault of the legal profession. And the loss of
the true meaning of "tragedy" is a literary, not a legal, loss.
But there are abundant examples of linguistic havoc wrought
by lawyers and legal scholars as well. The "sex"-"gender" dis-
tinction, such a useful and critical one, has been virtually oblit-
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erated by the language of the law. A few other endangered
distinctions follow:
One notion that has, bafflingly, gained wide acceptance is
that "verbal" means the same thing as "oral." Job ads seek out
applicants with strong "written and verbal" communications
skills. One can almost imagine that this misusage originated
when a writer, stumped over whether to use "oral" or "vocal,"
hit upon "verbal" as a word that sounded as if it had overtones
of both. Either "oral" ("of the mouth") or "vocal" ("of the
voice") would have been a better choice. Lawyers, surpris-
ingly, are among the chief offenders in the "oral"-"verbal" con-
fusion, though they, above all, with their oral arguments and
oral contracts, should be sensitive to the distinction. "Verbal"
means "in words," and applies to written as well as spoken
communication. "Vocal" rather than "oral" is the better word
for spoken communication, the voice being more specific than
the mouth, and "oral" having a rather clinical tone to it. But
"oral" is pretty well entrenched as a result of such terms as"oral exam," and there is little benefit in arguing that those
things are all more vocal than oral.
Another distinction that is under attack by legal writers is
the difference between "imply" and "infer." In a profession in
which the word "implied" carries so much weight (as, for
example, in "implied contract"), it is particularly surprising to
see the word so flagrantly misused. It is a simple rule to
remember: The speaker or writer implies; the listener or
reader infers. But when a court finds a contract to contain an
implied term, legal commentators will observe that the court
has "implied" the term, when in fact the court has done
exactly the opposite. Here is a recent example:
The court could have implied an omitted term in the
parties' agreement that would terminate the community
property agreement where the parties are living separate
and apart in a defunct marriage. Such a term should be
implied in most community property agreements based on
the likely intent of the parties .... 9
Commentators adopt this usage probably because they
want to avoid suggesting that the parties to the contract
implied the term, the act of implying a term carrying with it at
39. Oltman, The Implied Termination of Community Property Agreements Upon
Permanent Separation, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 53, 59 (1990).
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least a suggestion of the parties' intention. Since the finding of
the implied term often has more to do with the intention of
the court than with that of the parties, the commentator notes
that the court "implied" the term. Yet there is a perfect word
for what the court has done, and it is "infer." Inference sug-
gests nothing about the intent of the speaker or writer to
imply; it is all in the intent and perception of the interpreter-
in this case, the court. The commentators' use of "imply"
instead of "infer" is probably intended as a shorthand form for"to find implied"-yet that is precisely what "infer" means.
To confuse two words that are ordinarily distinct is bad
enough; to choose a word when you mean its opposite is practi-
cally Orwellian in its enormity.
Instead of working on preserving distinctions that are
important for the sake of clarity, legal writers seem to deploy
their creative energies toward producing new distinctions
where none are needed.
VI. DISTINCTIONS IN SEARCH OF DIFFERENCES
The chief virtue that language have is clearness, and
nothing detracts from it so much as the use of unfamiliar
words.
-Hippocrates
While legal writers have blurred several once-useful dis-
tinctions by using distinct words as if they meant the same
thing ("gender" and "sex" is our principal example), legal writ-
ers have also created many distinctions that are entirely unnec-
essary. Do we need the words "illegal" and "unlawful" both?
Does "wrongful" mean something different from "wrong"?
"Wrong" alone implies a moral judgment. "Wrongful," by
adding a syllable, only makes the word more pompous and less
clear.
Does the legalistic neologism "coequal" add anything to
the meaning of the time-honored word "equal?" It seems only
to suggest a kind of superequality: Not only does A equal B,
and B equal A, but A and B equal each other! Imagine!
They're both equal together! the word seems to proclaim. But
equality being absolute, it is of no consequence whether A and
B are equal together or separately. They are equal, and that's
that.
Legal writers are also at pains to promulgate the notion
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that "prior to" means something different from-and ever so
much more important than-the homely and serviceable
"before." And in a particularly wretched excess, the American
Law Institute tried to persuade the world that "reasonable"
and "rational" have significantly different meanings:
The phrase "rationally believes" is intended to permit a
significantly wider range of discretion than the term "rea-
sonable," and to give a director or officer safe harbor from
liability for business judgments that might arguably fall
outside the term "reasonable" but are not so removed from
the realm of reason when made that liability should be
incurred. °
Besides fostering the circular notion that liability should
be incurred only when liability should be incurred, this com-
ment rests on the dubious premise that "reasonable" beliefs
and actions are more narrowly defined than "rational" ones-a
premise that convinced few and that surprised many who had
always thought that "reasonable" and "rational" mean nearly,
if not exactly, the same thing. The only real difference
between "reasonable" and "rational" is that the former comes
from Latin by way of French while the latter comes directly
from Latin.
Similarly, legislators are particularly fond of using the
term "oversight" in place of the term "supervision," which
means the same thing but comes directly from the Latin rather
than detouring through German. "Oversight" has the unfortu-
nate quality of introducing ambiguity, since its other mean-
ing-a mistake or omission-has a negative connotation that a
legislative committee ought to want to avoid. The term "legis-
lative oversight" sounds more like an excuse than a
responsibility.
Another instance of legal writing undoing language is
demonstrated in this following example:
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evi-
dence is offered for another purpose, such as... negativing a
41contention of undue delay ....
No one other than a lawyer has ever believed that "nega-
tive" is a verb. For the rest of the world, "negate" works just
40. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(a) comment (Tent. Draft No. 4
1985).
41. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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fine; so do "deny," "counter," "contradict," and "defend
against," depending on context.
It may not, however, seem a particularly grievous offense
to use an adjective as a verb, even when perfectly serviceable
verbs exist. If all it does is to substitute one word for another,
with the same intended meaning, where's the loss of clarity?
The answer is that a neologism, by its very existence, seems to
suggest a different meaning, even when none is intended. "If
they meant 'negate,' " the reader thinks, "they would have said'negate.' Since they said 'negative' instead, they must mean
something different by it." In fact, the writers didn't mean
anything different at all; they wanted only to use a word that
sounded more official without altering the meaning. But
implying a difference where there really is none muddles the
reader's thinking, and it is in that muddle that clarity is lost.
There is an inherent logic to language and to word-forma-
tion, however elusive that logic may sometimes be. Communi-
cations Professor C. Ray Penn recognized as much when he
recently told the Blacksburg, Virginia Unitarian Fellowship
that "a choice of ambiguous words creates a world in which
skepticism reigns . . . a world in which no one will ultimately
trust any word."'  When we violate the internal logic of our
language, or of language in general, we impoverish our ability
to communicate, to be understood, and to be reasoned with.
That is because language-whether written, spoken, or
thought-is the sine qua non of rational discourse.
VII. JUST LET THE LANGUAGE GROW, WHY DON'TCHA?
But doesn't a language have to be allowed to grow, along
with its people, society, and culture? It does, without question.
As Philo of Alexandria once remarked, growth is "coherence
capable of moving itself."43  Coinages and neologisms can
enrich and refresh the language, make it more colorful, and
add to the communicator's arsenal. People are constantly giv-
ing English new ways of saying and naming, new ways of
catching "what oft was thought but ne'er so well express'd.""
42. Address by C. Ray Penn, A Choice of Words Is a Choice of Worlds, Delivered
to the Unitarian Fellowship, Blacksburg, Virginia (Sept. 2, 1990) reprinted in LVII:4
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 116, 116-17 (1990).
43. E.E. BRUSSEL, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF QUOTABLE DEFINITIONS
244 (1988).
44. A. POPE, Essay on Criticism, Part II, line 98 in SELECTED WORKS 40 (Modern
Library ed. 1951).
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But when lazy or sloppy usage blurs once-important and useful
distinctions or obliterates meaning, the result is not growth but
disintegration, and not only of language but of thought. Philo's"coherence" ceases to be part of the equation.
Linguistic change occurs slowly, in response to the chang-
ing needs of a culture. Its growth is coherence capable of mov-
ing itself Linguistic change should not be achieved by
mandate or by popularity poll.
Whether the revisers of language make an error seem cor-
rect (as with the "geoduck" example), or make a correct usage
seem erroneous (the problem of "sex" and "gender," where we
began), the delicate relationship between the word and mean-
ing, the relationship we call clarity, is damaged, perhaps
destroyed.
The ancient Chinese had a saying: "The beginning of wis-
dom is to call things by their correct names." Lawyers,
lawmakers, and law professors have a unique power over our
language and wisdom. We will all be the poorer if we do not
wield it wisely.
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